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Abstract. Recently, a groundswell of research has identified the use of counter-
factual explanations as a potentially significant solution to the Explainable AI 
(XAI) problem. It is argued that (i) technically, these counterfactual cases can be 
generated by permuting problem-features until a class-change is found, (ii) psy-
chologically, they are much more causally informative than factual explanations, 
(iii) legally, they are GDPR-compliant. However, there are issues around the 
finding of “good” counterfactuals using current techniques (e.g. sparsity and 
plausibility). We show that many commonly-used datasets appear to have few 
“good” counterfactuals for explanation purposes. We propose a new case-based 
approach for generating counterfactuals, using novel ideas about the counterfac-
tual potential and explanatory coverage of a case-base. The new technique re-
uses patterns of good counterfactuals, present in a case-base, to generate analo-
gous counterfactuals that can explain new problems and their solutions. Several 
experiments show how this technique can improve the counterfactual potential 
and explanatory coverage of case-bases, that were previously found wanting. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a tsunami of papers on Explainable AI (XAI) reflecting 
concerns that recent advances in machine learning may be limited by a lack of trans-
parency (see e.g., [1, 2]) or by government regulation (e.g., GDPR in the EU, see [3, 
4]; for reviews [5, 6, 7, 8]). Historically, Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) has always 
given a central role to explanation, as predictions can readily be explained by cases, 
akin to human reasoning from precedent/example [9, 10, 11]; see [11-15]). Indeed, 
Keane & Kenny’s [16, 17] twin systems approach, explicitly maps opaque deep-learn-
ing systems into CBR systems to find post-hoc explanatory cases for their predictions. 
Typically, CBR uses “factual cases” (i.e., nearest like neighbors that provide evidence 
for why a prediction was made, see [16, 17]). But, recently, there has been explosion 
of interest in a different class of explanatory cases, so-called counterfactual cases (i.e., 
nearest unlike neighbors that explain how a prediction might be changed). For example, 
a loan application system might explain its decision to refuse a loan by presenting a 
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factual case: “you were refused because a previous customer had the same salary as 
you and they were refused a loan for this amount”. In contrast, same loan system might, 
arguably, provide a better explanation by presenting a counterfactual case; effectively 
saying “if you asked for a slightly lower amount you would have been granted the loan”. 
Researchers championing the use of counterfactual explanations, argue that they pro-
vide better solutions to the XAI problem [7, 18, 19, 20, 21] (see section 2).   
     In this paper, we consider the feasibility of counterfactual explanations from a CBR 
perspective. Though any CBR system could explain its predictions directly using coun-
terfactual cases, in the present work, we are assuming a twin-system context [16, 17]; 
where there is an opaque machine-learning model (e.g., deep learning system) that is 
generating predictions that have to be explained by finding case-based explanations 
from a twinned CBR system1. In this context, we assess how many “good” counterfac-
tuals are available in a given case-base (i.e., ones that are easily comprehended by peo-
ple). So, we systematically map the topology of “good” counterfactuals in different 
case-bases, what we call their counterfactual potential (see section 2). Initially, we per-
form an analysis of 20 frequently used case-bases from the CBR literature (see sec-
tion 3). To our surprise, to presage our results, we find that in most case-bases “good” 
counterfactuals are quite rare. This leads us to the novel notion of explanatory coverage 
by analogy to predictive coverage [22, 23, 24], from which we develop and evaluate a 
new case-based technique for counterfactual generation in XAI (sections 4-5). 
2 Counterfactual Explanation: Promise, Problems & Prospects 
Intuitively, counterfactual explanations seem to provide better explanations than factual 
ones; in CBR-ese, nearest-unlike-neighbor (NUN) explanations are better than nearest-
like-neighbor (NLN) explanations2. Imagine you are at a party and you want to know 
whether you are okay to drive home; you have the latest DeepDrink app that can predict 
whether you are under or over the alcohol limit for driving. DeepDrink knows your 
physical details and, after you tell it how many drinks you have taken, your recent food 
consumption and when you started drinking, it predicts that you are over the limit ex-
plaining its prediction using a factual case, saying that a person with a similar profile 
to you was also over the limit when they were breathalysed (see Table 1). This expla-
nation is reasonable but perhaps not as good as one using a counterfactual case; which 
would tell you that someone with your profile who drank a similar amount over a longer 
period, ended up being under the limit (see “good” counterfactual in Table 1). The 
counterfactual directly tells you more about the causal dependencies in the domain and, 
importantly, provides you with “actionable” information (i.e., that if you stopped drink-
ing for 30 minutes you could be under the limit). Technically, counterfactuals can tell 
 
1   Thus, this context assumes an existing (albeit opaque) model to which cases can be presented 
to find predictions/labels. Access to such a model is assumed by all counterfactual-generation 
techniques, though there is some discussion around whether the training data would also al-
ways be accessible (obviously, we assume that training-data/case-base is available). 
2   We have found few CBR papers that seriously consider counterfactual cases (aka NUNs) for 
explanation. Obviously, NUNs have been studied in CBR, but typically not for explanation 
(e.g., [25, 26]).   [27-29] did consider NUNs in an explanation context, but more as confidence 
indicators with respect to decision boundaries. 
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you about the feature differences that affect the decision boundary around a prediction. 
Accordingly, [20] define counterfactual explanations as statements taking the form: 
Score y was returned because variables V had values (v1, v2,.. ). If V had values 
(v1', v2' ... ), and all others remain constant, score y' would have been returned.  
where, in our example, score y would be the class “over the limit” and y' the class “under 
the limit”. Recently, researchers championing counterfactual cases for XAI have argued 
that psychologically, technically and legally they provide better explanations than other 
techniques for XAI [7, 19, 20, 30, 31].   
Table 1. A Test Case paired with a “Good” and a “Bad” Counterfactual from the Blood Alcohol 
Content (BAC) case-base with the feature-differences between them (shown in bold italics) 
Features Test Case “Good” Counterfactual “Bad” Counterfactual 
Weight 80 kg 80 kg 80 kg 
Duration 1 hr 1.5 hrs 3 hrs 
Gender Male Male Female 
Meal Empty Empty Full 
Units 6 6 6.5 
Bac Level Over Under Under 
2.1 Counterfactual Promise 
Many have argued that counterfactual thinking has a promising role to play in explana-
tion from philosophical, psychological, computational and legal perspectives. Philoso-
phers of science have argued that true causal explanation only emerges from contrastive 
propositions, using counterfactuals (see e.g., [32, 33]). Psychologists have also shown 
that counterfactuals play a key role in human cognition and emotion, eliciting sponta-
neous causal thinking about what might have been the case (e.g. [18, 19, 34]). Byrne 
[19] has explicitly related this literature to the XAI problem, laying out the different 
ways in which counterfactuals could be used (see also [7, 35]). For example, as coun-
terfactuals engender more active causal thinking in people, they are more likely to fa-
cilitate “human in the loop” decision making [19]. Recently, Dodge et al. [36] assessed 
explanations of biased classifiers using four different explanation styles and found 
counterfactual explanations to be the most effective. In AI, Pearl [31] has proposed an 
influential structural Bayesian approach to counterfactuals that has been used to test the 
fairness of AI systems, but it has been less used in explanation generation (e.g., see [37, 
38, 39]). In the XAI literature, the use of counterfactuals has emerged as an active coun-
terpoint to popular post-hoc perturbation approaches (e.g., LIME, [40, 41]; and also 
[42]), with many researchers arguing that counterfactuals provide more robust and in-
formative post-hoc explanations [21, 30, 43-45]; these “counterfactualists” have also 
argued that counterfactual explanations are GDPR compliant [4, 20, 44]. 
2.2 Counterfactual Problems 
However, the promise of counterfactuals for XAI comes with a number of problems; 
the three main ones being prolixity, sparcity and plausibility.  
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     Prolixity. Currently, most XAI systems generate counterfactuals using random per-
turbation and search, making them very prolix [4, 20]; that is, many different counter-
factuals may be produced for a given test case from which a “good” one must be se-
lected (e.g., in the loan system, one could be shown counterfactuals for every 10$ in-
cremental change in one’s salary, but this would not be very helpful). Stated simply, 
this prolixity is reduced by using methods that find the minimal changes to the features 
of the test case that flip the prediction (i.e., the nearest unlike neighbor). So, [20] pro-
pose the following loss function, L: 
 				𝐿(𝑥, 𝑥!, 𝑦!, 𝜆) = 	𝜆(𝑓(𝑥!) − 𝑦!)" + 𝑑(𝑥, 𝑥!)  (1) 𝑎𝑟𝑔min#! max$ 𝐿(𝑥, 𝑥!, 𝑦!, 𝜆)    (2) 𝑑(𝑥, 𝑥!) = ∑ %#!&#!"%'()!*+,- ,    (3) 					𝑀𝐴𝐷+ = 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛.∈{-,…,3}>?𝑥.,+ −𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛5∈{-,…,3}(𝑥5,+)?@ (4) 
 
where x is the vector for the test case and x' is the counterfactual vector, with y' being 
the desired (flipped) prediction from f (..) the trained model, where λ	acts as the balanc-
ing weight. In formula (2), λ	balances the closeness of the counterfactual to the test case 
against making the smallest possible changes to the test case while delivering a predic-
tion change, using the distance metric in (3) and (4) which is Manhattan Distance (L1) 
using the median absolute deviation (MAD) of each feature. While different researchers 
optimize this function in different ways [20, 44, 46] tests show that this technique finds 
minimally-mutated counterfactuals to the test case, solving the prolixity problem (see 
also [44] work on diversity between generated counterfactuals). 
    Sparcity. These methods also profess to solve the sparcity problem. All commenta-
tors argue that good explanatory counterfactuals need to be sparse; that is, they need to 
modify the fewest features in the selected counterfactual. For example, Table 1 shows, 
for the blood alcohol domain, two different counterfactuals, one with a 1-feature change 
and another with a 4-feature change, where the sparcity of the former makes it better 
than the latter. So, [4] argue their MAD distance metric delivers sparse counterfactuals 
(see above), although tests [46] show that many of these counterfactuals may still in-
volve relatively high numbers of feature-differences (e.g.,  >4). Importantly, the argu-
ment for sparcity is a psychological one that has not been specifically tested in the XAI 
literature. Typically, AI researchers propose sparcity is important because of human 
working memory limits [47, 48], but we believe that people prefer sparse counterfactu-
als because of constraints on human category learning. For example, [49] have shown 
that, in concept learning, when people are trying to learn categories for unfamiliar items 
they prefer single-feature changes between to-be-learned items over multiple-feature 
changes, because it makes the learning task easier (unless there is additional domain 
knowledge showing dependencies between features). Based on this evidence, we oper-
ationalize the sparcity of “good” counterfactuals (as items with 1 or 2 feature differ-
ences) versus “bad” counterfactuals (those with >2 feature changes). This definition 
allows us to develop the novel idea of the counterfactual potential of case-bases, based 
on quantifying the “good” counterfactuals they contain (see sections 4-5). 
     Plausibility. The final problem is that of plausibility; that is, the counterfactuals 
generated may not be valid data-points in the domain or they may suggest feature-
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changes that are difficult-to-impossible. For example, classic cases of such counterfac-
tuals in the loans domain, are explanations that propose increasing one’s salary by an 
implausible amount (i.e., if you earned $1M, you would get the loan) or quite radical 
proposals (i.e., if you changed your gender, you would get the loan). Plausibility is the 
least solved of the three problems facing counterfactuals;  for instance, many research-
ers propose to “lock” features (e.g., to not allow gender change) or to allow users to 
provide inputs on feature weights [44] (e.g., using sliders at the interface on, say, salary 
boundaries). However, attempts to find an automated solution to the plausibility prob-
lem are thin on the ground3. Here, we propose that, rather than generating counterfac-
tuals by “blind” random perturbation, an XAI system should use the training-data/case-
base to find suitable counterfactuals; as these counterfactuals are “real experiences” 
from the problem domain, they have an inherent plausibility. However, this leads us to 
another question: namely, how many good counterfactuals are “naturally” available in 
case-bases or, more simply, what is their counterfactual potential. 
2.3 CBR’s Prospects for Counterfactuals  
Most techniques for generating counterfactuals for XAI perform random perturbations 
of a query-case followed by search to find a minimally-different case that is close to 
the decision boundary (i.e., a NUN). These perturbation techniques can encounter prob-
lems, notably in meeting sparcity and plausibility, which may benefit from a case-based 
approach. Just as CBR has successfully explained predictions using factual cases [29, 
12], perhaps it can also deliver counterfactual cases that are sparse (selected using a 
suitable similarity metric) and plausible (because they are based on previously encoun-
tered training data). However, if CBR is to be used, we need to establish whether case-
bases actually contain good counterfactuals, whether they have high counterfactual po-
tential.   In what follows we define a good counterfactual to be a NUN that differs from 
the query case by no more than 2 features. This potential can be determined by compu-
ting the feature-differences in all pairwise comparisons of cases in the case-base. If 
these comparisons show there are many “good” counterfactuals then the potential is 
high, if not then it is low. So, in our first experiment, we computed the counterfactual 
potential of 20 classic datasets, used in the CBR literature, from the UCI repository 
[51]. From this analysis we develop the idea of explanatory coverage before proposing 
a novel case-based technique for counterfactual generation (section 4). Finally, in sec-
tion 5, we report a set of experiments on five representative datasets to show how the 
technique can improve counterfactual potential. 
3 Experiment 1: Plotting Counterfactual Potential 
In this experiment, we computed the counterfactual potential of 20 classic datasets from 
the UCI repository [51], ones that have been commonly used in 10s if not 100s of CBR 
papers. This analysis was done by computing the number of feature differences between 
 
3   One notable exception is [50] who try to “justify” generated counterfactuals with respect to 
nearest neightbours from the training set.  
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all pairwise comparisons of cases in the case-base, noting the proportion of “good” 
counterfactuals found (i.e., ≤2 feature difference counterfactuals). This analysis pro-
vides us with an upper/lower bound on the potential of a case-base to deliver good 
counterfactuals. Obviously, in any specific CBR system, one might be able to adjust 
weights, feature-matches or k-values to find such counterfactuals, but such fine-tuning 
will not improve matters hugely if good counterfactual-cases are just not there. 
Table 2. Percent Counterfactuals for Feature-Differences in 20 UCI Datasets (Expt.1) 
  
3.1   Method: Data Sets & Procedure 
Twenty UCI datasets were used in the experiment, selected on the basis of their com-
mon usage in CBR. We compared all pairings of test cases (one side of a decision 
boundary) to training cases (on the other side of a decision boundary) calculating the 
the number of feature differences found in each.  
3.2 Results & Discussion 
Table 2 shows the counterfactual potential of these UCI datasets, as the percentage of 
counterfactuals with 1 upto >5 feature-differences. These results show that “good” 
DataSets N of 
cases 
Feat. 
No. 
Class 
No 
N of 
Pairs 
1-diff 2-diff 3-diff 4-diff >5-diff 
Abalone  4177 10 8 15.6M 0% 0% 0% 0% 99.9% 
Auto MPG  398 8 5 52.3k 0% 0% 0% 0.4% 99.6% 
BAC  9291 7 2 19M 0% 1.5% 23% 3% 72% 
Bupa liver  345 6 2 29k 0% 0% 0.1% 3.1% 96.8% 
Credit  653 15 2 105.7k 0% 0% 0% 0% 99.9% 
Cleveland heart 303 13 5 32.9k 0% 0% 0% 0.1% 99.9% 
Ecoli  336 7 7 41k 0% 0% 0% 0.2% 99.8% 
Glass  214 9 7 21.9k 0% 0% 0% 0% 99.9% 
German credit 914 20 2 177k 0% 0% 0% 0% 99.9% 
Horse colic 300 22 2 20.8k 0% 0% 0% 0% 99.9% 
Indian liver  583 10 2 69.5k 0% 0% 0% 0% 99.9% 
Ionosphere  351 34 2 28.3k 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
Iris  150 4 3 7.5k 0% 0.3% 8.8% 91% - 
Sonar  208 60 2 10.8k 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
Soybean (large) 307 26 19 43k 0% 0% 0.2% 0.6% 99.2% 
Thyroid  2800 27 3 355.8k 0% 0% 0% 0% 99.9% 
Votes  435 17 2 44.8k 0% 0.3% 0.9% 1.9% 88.8% 
Wine-Italian   178 13 3 10.4k 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
Wisconsin breast  699 9 2 110k 0% 0% 0% 0.4% 99.5% 
Yeast  1484 8 10 855.3k 0% 0% 0.3% 4.8% 94.9% 
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counterfactuals are rare4; in nearly every dataset, the 1-diff and 2-diff counterfactual 
categories account for < 1% of the total collection of counterfactuals. Most counterfac-
tuals involve >5 feature-differences, showing poor sparsity.  
      It should be noted that in the above, we determine feature differences using a exact-
match approach. Such an approach is inherently conservative in the case of real-valued 
features. In practice, this can be addressed by introducing a degree of matching toler-
ance so that, for example, we treat two feature values as equivalent if they are within 
1% of each other. While this improves counterfactual availability, we still found that 
the fraction of good counterfactuals (≤2 feature differences) typically remains very low. 
      On the face of it, this suggests that perhaps a case-based approach to counterfactual 
generation is a bad idea. If most case-bases do not deliver up many good counterfactuals 
then case-based techniques may be bound to fail? However, as we shall see in the fol-
lowing sections, there are additional steps that can be applied to meet these challenges. 
4 A Case-Based Technique for Good Counterfactuals 
The above analysis of case-bases suggests that, ironically, CBR seems to have little to 
offer with respect to the use of counterfactuals in XAI. For most case-bases good coun-
terfactuals are rare and/or are hard to find; that few query/problem-cases will have an 
associated good counterfactual-case. Perhaps this explains why the dominant technique 
in the literature uses perturbation, where synthetic counterfactuals are generated 
“blindly” from problem-cases and labelled using the available machine-learning model, 
without reference to other known cases in the training set [21, 30, 43, 44, 45, 46]. In 
contrast to these approaches, we believe that counterfactuals need to be explicitly 
grounded in known cases (aka the training data), to ensure plausibility. Hence, we have 
developed a novel case-based technique for counterfactual-XAI which re-uses patterns 
of good counterfactuals, that already exist in a case-base, to generate analogous coun-
terfactuals that are suitable to explain new target problems and their solutions. When it 
comes to generating new counterfactuals, these existing good counterfactuals provide 
‘hints’ about what features can and should be adapted and plausible feature values to 
use for them. This new technique relies on the notion of explanatory competence (see 
4.1). As we said earlier, the context for the use of this method is a twin-system approach 
to XAI, where an opaque model (e.g., a deep learning network) is “explained” by twin-
ning it with a more transparent CBR-system to find explanatory cases [16,17]; so, along 
with all other counterfactual-generation techniques, we assume that an ML model is 
available to assign labels for any newly-generated case. 
 
4   We extensively tested the Blood Alcohol Content (BAC, [27-29]) case-base, but cannot report 
it for reasons of space. Using a mechanical model for estimating BAC, we generated many 
different master-case-bases from which we sampled 50+ specific case-bases, all of which re-
peatedly showed the same absence of good counterfactuals.  
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4.1 Explanatory Competence 
The notion of predictive competence or simply competence (i.e., an assessment of an 
ML/CBR system’s potential to solve a range of future problems) has proved to be a 
very useful development for AI systems [24]. For example, in CBR, predictive compe-
tence has been used to assess the overall problem-solving potential of a system, to help 
avoid the utility problem as a case-base grows, to maintain case-bases and so on [22, 
23]. A parallel notion of explanatory competence can also be applied to any case-base.  
      Just as the fundamental unit of (predictive) competence is a relation of the form 
solves(c, c') to indicate that case/example c can be used to solve some target/query c', 
so too the basic unit of explanatory competence is explains(c, c') indicating that some 
case c can be used to explain the solution of c'; in this work, the explanatory cases (c) 
are the counterfactuals of c'. Accordingly, the explanatory competence of a case-base 
C can be represented by a coverage set (Eq. 1) and degree of explanatory competence 
can be estimated as the size of the coverage set as a fraction of the case-base (Eq. 2). 
 
XP_Coverage_Set(C) = { c' Î C |  $ c Î C-{c'} & explains(c, c')} (1) 
 
XP_Coverage(C) = |XP_Coverage_Set(C)| / |C|   (2) 
4.2 Leveraging Counterfactual Cases for Explanation 
Although good counterfactuals are rare, in practice we can expect most case-bases to 
offer some examples where a query/problem case can be associated with a good coun-
terfactual, with or without some matching tolerance as mentioned previously. For ex-
ample, in the Abalone dataset, even though there are few good counterfactuals, using a 
similarity tolerance of 0.02 means that  just over 20% of cases can be associated with 
good counterfactuals; for the Liver a tolerance of 0.025 means that 4% of cases can be 
associated with good counterfactuals. Can pairs of cases and their corresponding good 
counterfactuals guide the search for novel (good) counterfactuals for new target prob-
lems that are otherwise without a good counterfactual? 
     In what follows we will refer to the pairing of a case and its corresponding good 
counterfactual as an explanation case or XC. For any given case-base we can generate 
a corresponding case-base of these explanation cases for use during counterfactual gen-
eration; see Eqs. 3 and 4. By definition explanation cases are symmetric –– either of 
the cases can be viewed as the query or counterfactual, which, in practice, means that 
each pair of unlike neighbours, which differ by ≤2 features, contributes two XCs to the 
XC case-base.  
 
xc(c, c’) Û class(c) ≠ class(c') & diffs(c, c') ≤ 2   (3) 
 
XC(C) = {(c, c') : c, c' Î C & xc(c, c')}    (4) 
 
Each XC is associated with a set of match-features (m), the features that are the same 
between the query and counterfactual (using a specified tolerance), and a set of differ-
ence-features (d), the ≤2 features that differ between the query and counterfactual. 
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Figure 1. An illustration of (a) a two-class case-base with 3 explanation cases; (b) how a syn-
thetic counterfactual, (p, p'), is generated from an existing explanation-case, xc(x, x'). 
 
Figure 1(a) shows a two-class case-base of cases (C) along with its corresponding XCs 
-–  xc(x, x'),  xc(y, y'), and xc(z, z') – along with two query cases (p and q), which have 
been classified by the underlying ML-model, and which now need to be explained. For 
our purposes, we assume that there are no existing good counterfactuals for p or q in C, 
hence the need to generate new good counterfactuals for them. 
4.3 A Case-Based Approach to Generating Good Counterfactuals 
We propose a classical case-based reasoning approach to generating good counterfac-
tuals by retrieving, reusing, and revising a nearby explanation case as follows: 
1. First, we identify the XC case whose query is most similar to p; this is xc(x, x') in 
Figure 1. Since xc(x, x') has a good counterfactual, x', and because the p is similar 
to x, then the intuition is that x' is a suitable basis for a new counterfactual p'  to 
explain p. The difference-features between x and x', which are solely responsible 
for the class change between x and x', should play a critical role in constructing p'. 
2. For each of the match-features in xc(x,x'), we copy the values of these features in 
p to the new counterfactual p'. Similarly, for each of the difference-features in 
xc(x, x') we copy their values from x' into p'. In this way, p' is a combination of 
feature values from p and x'. It differs from p in a manner that is similar to the way 
in which x' differs from x and, by construction, p' is a candidate good counterfac-
tual because these differences amount to no more than two features. This transfer 
of values from p and x' into p' is illustrated in Figure 1(b). 
3. For p' to be actually a good counterfactual, it has to be a different class from p, 
which is not yet guaranteed. We determine the class of p'  by using the underlying 
ML-model (from the twin-system)  and if it is different from p then p' can be used 
directly as a good counterfactual to explain p (see Figure 1(a)). 
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4. Sometimes, however, the class of the new counterfactual, after retrieval/reuse, is 
not different from the target query. For example, the new counterfactual q', which 
is generated for q by reusing xc(y, y') in Figure 1a, has the same class as q, because 
the combination of the match-feature values (from q) and difference-features 
(from y') are not sufficient to change its class from that of q.  
5. Since q'  is not a valid counterfactual, we perform an adaptation step to revise the 
values of the difference-features in q' until there is a class change; note, we cannot 
change the match-features in q' without increasing the number of feature differ-
ences with q. We can revise the values of the difference-features in q' in various 
ways, for example, by perturbing them to further increase their distance from q. 
However, we instead iterate over the ordered nearest neighbours of q with the 
same class as y', until there is a class change5. The values of the difference features 
from each nearest neighbour leads to a new candidate, q'', and adaptation termi-
nates successfully when the class of q'' differs from that of q; if none of the neigh-
bours produce a class change, then adaptation fails. In Figure 1(a), when the dif-
ference-feature values from the neighbour, nn, are used to produce q'', the result 
is a class change, and so q'' can be used as a good counterfactual for q.  
Note that the primary contribution of explanation cases is to identify and distinguish 
between common combinations of features (match-features and difference-features) 
that tend to participate in good counterfactuals. Depending on the domain this may 
reflect some important relationships (causal or otherwise) that exist within the feature-
space. In other words, the XCs tell us about which features should be changed (or held 
constant) when generating new counterfactuals in the feature space near a query case. 
      Another advantage of this approach is that because it reuses actual feature values 
from real cases, it should lead to more plausible counterfactuals and, better explana-
tions. This contrasts with perturbation approaches, which  rely on arbitrary values for 
features (and may even produce invalid data-points).   
     Finally, though our approach may succeed in finding a suitable counterfactual with-
out the need for the adaptation/revision step, it may be desirable to proceed with this 
step, nonetheless. This is because the adaptation step has the potential to locate a suit-
able counterfactual that is closer to the query than the candidate counterfactual pro-
duced by the retrieval step alone and finding counterfactuals that are maximally similar 
to the query is an important factor when it comes to explanation [20].  
5 Experiment 2: Evaluating Explanation Competence 
We provide a preliminary evaluation of the above approach using five popular  
ML/CBR datasets to demonstrate how explanatory competence can be improved above 
and beyond the baseline level of good counterfactuals that naturally occurs in a dataset. 
 
5  For multi-class datasets, this adaptation could be modified to iterate over all ordered nearest 
neighbours with a different class to q, not just those with the same class as y’. This would 
provide a larger pool of difference-feature values and increase the likelihood of locating a 
good counterfactual for q. We leave this variation, and its evaluation, for future work.  
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5.1 Method: Data & Procedure 
Each of the datasets represents a classification task of varying complexity, in terms of 
the number of classes, features, and training examples. The task of interest, however, 
is not a classification one but an explanation one. As such we are attempting to generate 
good counterfactuals in order to explain target/query cases and their classes. The key 
evaluation metrics will be: (a) the fraction of target/query cases than can be associated 
with good counterfactuals (explanatory competence); and (b) the distance from the tar-
get/query to the newly generated good counterfactual (counterfactual distance).  
 
Figure 2. The explanatory competence (XP_Coverage) of five case-bases, showing baseline 
competence and how competence increases by reusing and adapting explanation cases. 
     As a baseline for explanatory competence we use the fraction of cases that can be 
associated with a good counterfactual in each case-base; in each case we use a matching 
tolerance of 1-2%. As a corresponding baseline for counterfactual distance, we will use 
the average distance between these cases and their good counterfactuals. A 10-fold 
cross-validation was used to evaluate the newly generated counterfactuals, selecting 
10% of the cases at random to use as queries, and building the XC case-base from the 
remaining cases. Then, we use the above technique to generate good counterfactuals 
for the queries, noting the fraction of the queries that can be associated with good coun-
terfactuals, and the corresponding counterfactual distances, after the retrieval/reuse and 
adaptation steps. Results reported are the averages for the 10 folds for each dataset. 
5.2 Results & Discussion: Explanatory Competence 
The explanatory competence results are presented in Figure 2, showing the explanatory 
competence (fraction of queries that can be explained) for the dataset (baseline), and 
for the synthetic counterfactuals generated after the retrieval and adaptation steps of 
our approach. The results show how explanatory competence can be significantly in-
creased by the case-based-counterfactual technique. For example, on average only 
about 11% of the cases in these datasets can be associated with good counterfactuals 
(the average baseline competence when a tolerance is applied) but by retrieving and 
reusing explanation cases we can reach an average explanatory competence of just over 
40%. Implementing the adaptation step further increases the explanatory competence 
just under 94%, on average. Notably, even datasets with very low baseline explanatory 
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competence benefit from significant improvements in explanatory competence partic-
ularly when the adaptation step is used. For example, the 6,400 case Wine dataset (12 
features and 7 classes) has a baseline explanatory competence of just 6%, but its 559 
XC cases can be used to achieve almost 90% in explanatory competence.  
 
 
Figure 3. The counterfactual distance of the good counterfactuals produced for five case-bases, 
relative to the baseline counterfactual distance. 
5.3 Results & Discussion: Counterfactual Distance 
Of course, just because it is possible to generate a counterfactual for a query that has 
no more than 2 feature differences, does not necessarily mean that the counterfactual 
will make for an ideal explanation, in practice. To test this would require a succession 
of live user-trials, beyond the scope of the present work. As an alternative, however, 
we can use the distance between the query and the generated counterfactual as a proxy 
for the utility of the explanation, on the grounds that counterfactuals which are closer 
to a query are more likely to serve as more useful explanations. Since counterfactual 
distance will vary from dataset to dataset, reflecting the nature of the feature space, in 
this analysis we present a relative counterfactual distance (RCF) measure by dividing 
the counterfactual distances of the synthetic counterfactuals by the baseline counterfac-
tual distance for the dataset. Thus, if RCF>1, then it indicates that the synthetic coun-
terfactual is farther from the query that the average baseline counterfactual distance.  
     The results are presented in Figure 3, which include the relative distance of the good 
counterfactuals produced by the retrieval/reuse and the adaptation steps for each da-
taset. We also show the relative distance results for an additional condition, Closest, 
which is defined as follows: when both the retrieval/reuse and adaptation steps lead to 
a good counterfactual, then choose the one with the lower counterfactual distance, oth-
erwise if only one good counterfactual is produced then use its distance. 
      On average, good counterfactuals produced by the retrieval/reuse step are farther 
from the test query than the baseline counterfactual distance (RCF  » 1.2). In most cases 
the additional distance beyond the baseline is modest with the exception of the Liver 
dataset, where the  retrieval/reuse step produces good counterfactuals that are 55% 
(RCF  » 1.55) more distance from the query than the baseline distance. The good coun-
terfactuals produced by the adaptation step are closer to the test queries – the average 
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RCF  » 1.1, and in 3 out of the 5 datasets the generated counterfactuals are closer than 
the baseline (RCF  <1). If we select the closest counterfactual, when both retrieval/reuse 
and adaptation produce one, then the RCF<1 for all of the datasets. This further vali-
dates the need for, and quantifies the benefits of, the adaptation step: it provides an 
opportunity to choose a counterfactual that is significantly closer to the query. 
6 Conclusions & Future Directions 
In the last three years, there has been a significant upsurge in XAI research arguing for 
the computational, psychological and legal advantages of counterfactuals. Most of this 
work generates synthetic counterfactuals without reference to the training-data in the 
domain and, as such, can suffer from sparsity and plausibility deficits. In short, these 
methods do not guarantee the production of good counterfactuals and, may indeed, 
sometimes generate invalid data points. This state of affairs invites a case-based solu-
tion to counterfactual generation that leverages the prior experience of the case-base, 
adapting known counterfactual associations between query-problems and known cases. 
In this paper, we advance just such a technique and show how it can improve the coun-
terfactual potential of many datasets. In developing this technique, we have (i) clarified 
the definition of good counterfactuals, (ii) proposed the new idea of explanation com-
petence, (iii) reported significant new evidence for the utility of this novel technique.  
     The approach, as described, makes some assumptions that might limit its utility be-
yond the datasets discussed. It assumes the availability of at least some explanation 
cases, which is typically feasible; even though good counterfactuals are rare they are 
seldom so rare as exclude minimally viable explanation case-base, at least when a de-
gree of matching tolerance is allowed for when computing feature similarities and dif-
ferences. The approach also assumes the availability of an underlying ML-model (e.g., 
in twin system) for the purpose of counterfactual validation, though this is an accepted 
proposition in all approaches. Finally, though previous psychological work supports 
our operational definition of good counterfactuals, more user testing is required. Not-
withstanding this future research, from the current findings, it is clear that a CBR ap-
proach to counterfactual XAI has much to offer. 
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